Surprising the opponent in the main areas of strategic confrontation -information, political, economic, technological, ideological, psychological, espionage/counter- 
Introduction
The general theoretical approach to taking by surprise, due to its many reference levels, involves many difficulties resulting from a variety of analytical options expressed by established authors in the field of military art. The complexity of the analysis is amplified by the fact that taking by surprise can only be conceived in close connection with what appears unpredictable or even unknown in the armed conflict, a vast and diversified field of phenomena, which primarily addresses the human psyche. However complex the study of taking by surprise may be, there is one certainty, namely, that all significant military successes for the evolution of humanity have been obtained by applying some actional forms or procedures, which are very difficult or even impossible to be guessed by the opponent. The essence of taking by surprise is the unrepeatable character of action, determined by a conception of innovative actions, materialized by the use of combat techniques and weapon systems with superior characteristics to those previously used in the armed confrontations and expressed through the high level of operationalization of the forces, in turn, materialized in the very unexpected action on the battlefield. So, taking by surprise is the result of an action that was envisaged, planned, organized, and conducted in a manner and dynamics impossible or difficult to predict by the opponent, both in terms of time and place, and actional procedures. In order to achieve the maximum efficiency of the operational surprise, the Commandments which have proposed the application of this principle of the armed conflict have directed their conceptual and actional efforts on two main directions: determining the essential information that formed the foundation of the plan of the opponent's operation, simultaneously with his constant misinformation on the own intentions regarding the use of subordinate structures. The analysis of the history of military art reveals that the misinformation of the opponent over the real intentions of using the armed force has certainly been in the attention of the commanders and commandments in all historical eras, being applied with the means specific to the period. In order to reveal the modern character and the decisive role of misinforming the adversary in obtaining decisive victories for the contemporary evolution of humanity, we have selected some operations carried out in the context of the Second World War, as well as in some post-war armed conflicts. for the continued misinformation of the Japanese Command, the defensive disposition of the contact troops was directly amplified. "While Jukov was secretly preparing a major offensive, his soldiers gave the impression of preparing a static defensive line. Badly encoded messages were being sent, where more and more material was needed for pillboxes, the speakers emitted tumbling sounds, flyers with the title What the Soviet soldier should know about defense were distributed in huge quantities while some of them fell into the hands of the enemy. During this time, Jukov brought tanks for reinforcements during the night. And his truck drivers were exhausted, carrying ammunition reserves for the offensive on the awful roads from the end of rail to the front." [2] The Soviet defense, made up of three infantry divisions and a parachutist brigade, suffered the shock of the three successive attacks by the Japanese troops, succeeding after a month of violent confrontations in stopping the Japanese offensive and blocking their full advance. 
2.
There were rumors about a possible German attack, reports that boat bridges were being assembled near the border, but in Brussels they were all ignored. Many seemed to think that Hitler was going to attack in the south, in the Balkans, not in the West. In any case, few imagined that he would invade four countries -the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France -at the same time. In Paris, life continued unhindered by war. The capital had never been so beautiful. The Chestnuts had blossomed. The cafeꜘ s were full. The horse races were running according to the normal schedule, and the elegant women were crowding at Ritz. The most striking picture was that of the crowd of officers and soldiers on the streets because the General Staff had just restored the permits. In the UK, the Parliament had met and anxiously discussed the replacement of the prime minister. In Berlin, Hitler dictated to the armies on the western front his directive for the next day. At 21.00, the Gdansk code word was passed down to all army groups. The secret character had been so well preserved that, in spite of all the delays of the attack, some German officers had been surprised, being away from their regiments when they received the order to move. [4] Simultaneously with the exertion of pressure on the Maginot line to maintain as many French divisions as possible in this area, the great German units launched the air-terrorist operation against the Netherlands, as well as the French defense maneuver, instantly crossing the Ardeni Mountains and completely surprising the Franco-British allied forces. In the context described, we note the use of airborne troops, the use of armored vehicles on precisely defined directions and at a rate that surpassed even the forecasts of the German command, as well as of the special forces, dressed in Dutch or Belgian uniforms or disguised as tourists, who had been infiltrated, even before the offensive began, into the capitals of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands in order to mark the main targets to be hit by the aviation or conquered by the paratroopers. [ The Israeli Miraj and Mystère airplanes, flying low to avoid being detected by the Arab radar screens, acted so surprisingly that, for example, when dozens of planes were already wrecked in flames, the Cairo West control tower was transmitting "We are being attacked ... We are being attacked ... ", [6] without being able to tell the source of the aerial offensive. A particularly relevant fact is also the one about the attack time -07.45, when the Egyptian pilots were in their personal cars going to work, to the airbase, or were having their meal in the mess hall, which amplified the lack of reaction of the Egyptian aviation and the total chaos which was established within the armed forces, including the Egyptian High Command. Without any operative pause, after the complete destruction of the Egyptian airplanes on the ground, the Israeli airlines simultaneously redirected their attack on the Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi aviation, which they also took by surprise, mostly being aligned on airfields, and destroyed them in a few dozens of minutes. So the day chosen, as well as the time when the offensive on the Suez Canal began at 14:00, highlights the maximum attention that the Egyptian Command gave so as to surprise the Israeli forces and their reserve in a state of maximum relaxation. In order to misinform the Israeli intelligence services, in previous years in October, the large Egyptian units made extensive troop deployments near the Israeli borders, prompting the Israeli command to appreciate that all Egyptian troop concentrations at the border of the peninsula Sinai were part of the same scenario for the instruction of the Arab troops and were not, in fact, the prelude to a genuine and extensive offensive operation. [7] Initially, the pace of advancement of the Egyptian divisions was the expected one, carrying out the taking by surprise along the entire attack front of the Suez Canal. But, benefiting from the world's most advanced mobilization system, in spite of all the initial large losses, the Israeli army balanced the situation, including on the Syrian front, and gradually took over the strategic initiative, recapturing the territories occupied by the great Egyptian and Syrian units. In this respect, regarding the use of maritime attack, in the British Army regulations, as in all the norms in most armies of the world, the following main provisions were specified: -the assault on the landing beaches should be launched after a strong 2-3 hour fire preparation, which was to neutralize the defense; -in order to maintain the attack directions against the beaches, the offensive from the sea should start at dawn, thus ensuring the necessary visibility; -the landing should occur on beaches with straight, smooth slopes that allow the speeding up of transport vessels to the immediate vicinity of the shore and ensure the rapid maritime assault. In fact, on May 21, 1982, the British maritime attack took place in complete disagreement with these provisions, as follows:
-the action of the maritime attack began at midnight at 00.15, on a total darkness; -no fire preparation for the offensive took place on the beaches chosen for landing, but in other areas; -the assault on the islands took place in the areas with the most rugged beaches and rocky cliffs, where the Argentine forces almost naturally paid no attention to fighting safety measures. Within just three days, the British Armed Forces recaptured the archipelago although they attacked with 3,000 soldiers against a defensive system prepared for a long time and occupied by 12,000 Argentinians, thus in a ratio of numerically low forces of ¼. The explanation of this exceptional success lies in the masterful application of the misinformation and total taking by surprise of the Argentine troops defending the Malvine Islands, as well as in the high level of operationalization of the British expeditionary forces. [8] In the same logic of highlighting the fundamental role of misinformation, distraction and execution of the attack when the opponent is the least prepared or his forces are at the minimum threshold of alert, is also the launch of the occupation attack of Afghanistan by the Soviet invasion force, in 1979 at Christmas, when all Christians celebrated the birth of Jesus Christ, and thus the reaction of international public opinion was tardy and totally ineffective, or the Panama Operation of the US Armed Forces, which was launched and unfolded in the days when, for the first time in history, a revolution aimed at abolishing a dictatorial regime -the December 1989 Revolution in Romaniawas broadcast live by the national television, and within this framework, the attention of international public opinion was captured by the dramatic events taking place in Bucharest. During the Panamanian operation, the US Special Forces acted so surprisingly that there was virtually no reaction of the adverse forces.
Conclusions
The strategic taking by surprise, whose effects can be greatly amplified through subtle techniques of misinforming the opponent, is a concept with a wide range of scope. Throughout the history of the wars, it has maintained and consolidated its status as the armed conflict principle. Therefore, the assertions that in the next political-military confrontations, characterized by informational supertechnology, the taking by surprise will diminish up to the annulment of its consecrated connotations are fundamentally unrealistic. The implications for the physiognomy of the war and the obvious correlation with the other principles of the armed conflict will not allow the false perception of strategic surprise to be defined as mere information on the moment of starting the hostilities, since this did no more represent a military secret, even in the context of the recent military conflicts On the contrary, the end of all warnings given from the highest international level to some political-military leaders, regarding their attitude inconsistent with the general context of contemporary geopolitics, was characterized by the precise expression of the date of the initiation of the strategic offensive operation, in which the taking by surprise manifested itself through all the four fundamental components -informational, conceptual, and in particular technological and operationalactional -giving the planned actions a great deal of efficiency.
